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Accounting research in the context/setting of China has increased in the last decade. This reﬂects both the
importance of China as a global economic force and China being an interesting setting for providing insights
into the role of accounting. The call for papers for this symposium nicely summarizes the latter point by stat-
ing: “Ownership structure, the incentives of managers and auditors, board monitoring, enforcement, and
other institutional features of the economy all have an important impact on ﬁnancial reporting outcomes.
It is also conceivable that accounting standards and these institutional features complement each other in
determining accounting quality. Asian-Paciﬁc economies, including China, oﬀer an ideal setting to examine
these important issues given the relatively weak legal protection and enforcement in these economies.” Inction and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of China Journal of Accounting Research.
University of Hong Kong.
 Elsevier
ina Journal of Accounting Research Symposium, 2013 in Zhuhai, China. I am grateful to
rofessor Qiang Cheng and Professor Donghui Wu for the opportunity to write this paper.
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tutional and market-based regime to strong, one can provide important insights into accounting issues. My
objective in this article is to broaden this perspective by directing attention to the fact that mechanisms that
enabled China to succeed economically, did so despite what we term as “weak” institutions. The institutional
features that enabled such phenomenal economic growth would have necessarily relied on accounting and
control systems. As such, examining the role of accounting and control systems in the institutional framework
prior to and during China’s transition to a market-based economy would help expand our insights. For this
purpose, I draw on the framework in the economics literature that shows the unique institutional features in
China that possibly contributed to its economic success (Xu, 2011).
2. The China puzzle
China’s GDP has grown from US$ 1325 Billion in 2001 to US$ 7318 billion in 2011, which represents a
year-over-year growth rate of roughly 19%; the stock market capitalization increased from US$ 524 Billion
in 2001 to US$ 3389 in 2011, representing a year-over-year growth rate of 21%; the value of stocks traded
increased from US$ 449 Billion in 2001 to US$ 7671 in 2011, representing a year-over-year growth rate of
33% (see Table 1). These statistics indicate not only a tremendous growth in economic activity, but also a con-
certed move toward a market-based economy.
Conventional wisdom in economics suggests that the government should protect private property rights,
enforce contracts, and separate itself from business enterprise (North, 1990; Acemoglu and Robinson,
2012). In contrast to this conventional wisdom, the Chinese government conducts and directs business devel-
opment. Not surprisingly, China ranks below average on its institutional makeup of rule of law and gover-
nance quality (Allen et al., 2005). Thus, based on conventional wisdom, China’s institutions are weak, so
much so that the institutional infrastructure should not have supported the phenomenal economic growth
and the move toward a market-based economy. This is a seeming puzzle that is referred to as the China puzzle
by Xu (2011) who states, “This incredible contrast between poor institutions and China’s spectacular perfor-
mance challenges our general understanding of the mechanics of institutions and our understanding of
institutional quality.”
3. The institutional structure of China’s economic success
Broadly speaking, institutions refer to mechanisms that coordinate economic activities and thus govern the
incentives of agents (Coase, 1992; Stiglitz, 2002; Hurwicz, 2007). North (1990) deﬁnes institutions as “rules of
the game in a society or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.” The
key aspects embedded in these deﬁnitions are that institutions are a set of rules chosen by society, and in an
economic sense, these rules facilitate exchange. Coase (1937, 1991, 1992) in his discourse on the boundaries of
the ﬁrm and markets – where do ﬁrms end and markets begin – proposes that institutions act as coordination
mechanisms to facilitate exchange; when markets cannot do the job of coordination well enough, then the
coordination occurs in ﬁrms (see also Williamson, 1985, 2002). As to which coordination mechanism is better
suited for a particular activity is referred to, under the omnibus fuzzy terminology of “transactions costs.”
Under this broad view of institutions, Xu (2011) argues that it would not have been possible for China to
achieve such phenomenal growth without eﬀective coordination mechanisms or institutions. What was the
institutional structure that enabled China’s phenomenal growth? Xu (2011) outlines the salient aspects of Chi-
na’s institutional feature that enabled the phenomenal economic growth.
While institutions in most parts of the world – the Americas, Africa, Australia, South, and Far East Asia –
are greatly inﬂuenced by the Western governance systems due to colonization, China has a 2000 year-old
imperial history that was not directly inﬂuenced by the European institutions. The structure that prevailed
during the imperial regime provides the pillars of the institutional framework that guided the transition to
China’s market-based economy. Xu (2011) refers to the institutional structure as the Regionally Decentralized
Authoritarian (RDA) regime. The RDA regime features a combination of a highly decentralized decision-
making with respect to economic resources; a highly centralized decision-making with respect to policy and
personnel.
Table 1
China’s economy and stock market. Source: The conference board, total economy database.
Year GDP, Current US $
(Billions)
Number of Domestic Listed
Companies
Market Cap Current US $
(Billions)
Stocks traded, Current US $
(Billions)
2001 1325 1160 524 449
2002 1454 1235 463 333
2003 1641 1296 681 477
2004 1932 1384 640 748
2005 2257 1387 781 586
2006 2713 1440 2426 1635
2007 3494 1530 6226 7792
2008 4522 1604 2794 5471
2009 4991 1700 5008 8956
2010 5931 2063 4763 8030
2011 7318 2342 3389 7671
CAGR 19% 7% 21% 33%
CAGR is the compounded annual growth rate from 2001 to 2011.
S. Radhakrishnan / China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 1–8 3On the one hand, economic decision rights are decentralized and delegated to sub-national governments.
Regional economies – provinces, municipalities, and counties – are responsible for initiating and coordinating
economic activity by providing public services and enforcing laws within their jurisdictions. On the other
hand, sub-national government oﬃcials are appointed, promoted, and rotated by the center, which helps to
provide high-powered incentives for regional oﬃcials to follow the central government’s policies and achieve
economic performance. This institutional feature is diﬀerent from centrally-planned structure such as the erst-
while Soviet Union where decision-making was centralized. This institutional setup is diﬀerent from federalism
as in the U.S., because the regional oﬃcials are not accountable to the local constituents and citizens.
The institutional structure makes China similar to a large conglomerate during its move toward a market-
based system: referred to in the rest of the paper as China Inc. Similar to the headquarters of a conglomerate,
China Inc., provides high-powered incentives for sub-national government leaders, i.e., division managers
through personnel decisions. Similar to divisions of a conglomerate, the sub-national governments have deci-
sion rights over resources such as land, enterprises, ﬁnancial resources, energy, and raw materials. They ini-
tiate, negotiate, implement, divert, and resist reforms, policies, rules, and laws. They drive or hamper regional/
national economic development and macroeconomic conditions. They compete to achieve economic success
and initiate experiments with new reforms. The organizational setup of China Inc. follows the general precept
espoused in managerial accounting textbooks such as Zimmerman (1997) and accounting theory such as Sun-
der (1997) that decision-making should be delegated to the locus of information and expertise. Accordingly, it
is interesting to examine what control and coordination mechanisms helped achieve China’s phenomenal
growth, i.e., the success of a conglomerate.
While we have some understanding on the role of accounting in arms-length contracting and equity mar-
kets, or at least a framework for understanding the role of accounting in market-based economic settings,
China Inc. provides an excellent setting to examine the role of accounting in a diﬀerent framework of institu-
tions that were eﬀective in achieving China’s economic growth? Even though capital markets or labor and
product markets may not have existed in China Inc., accounting and control mechanisms should have neces-
sarily existed to help coordinate activities under decentralized decision-making.4. The focus of China accounting research
As highlighted by the call for papers of the CJAR symposium, research in accounting focuses on China’s
transition to a market economy wherein regulatory changes that facilitate transition from the traditional Chi-
nese institutions to Western ones that are suited for market economies are examined. Chen and Schipper
(2008) highlight the focus of China based accounting research very aptly in the following way: “Recently pub-
lished Chinese accounting research has addressed the causes and consequences of issues related to auditor
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from a listed ﬁrm by means of “tunneling”), earnings management and accounting implementations, the gov-
ernance of listed Chinese ﬁrms including ownership structure and executive turnover. Because of the focus on
corporate governance, accounting research in China currently has closer ties to corporation ﬁnance than does
accounting research in the U.S.” They then go onto point the potential research questions that State Owned
Enterprises (SOEs) and the privatization of these enterprises provide.
China provides an excellent setting to examine the role of accounting and agency issues. Agency issues arise
from the separation of ownership and control, referred to as the Type I agency problem) and arise from the
conﬂict between controlling and non-controlling shareholders, referred to as the Type II agency problem (see
Ali et al., 2007). The contrast between State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs provides an excellent
setting to examine Type II agency problems. China research has used the diﬀerential severity of agency prob-
lems to examine its eﬀects on earnings management and accounting quality (for example, see Jian and Wong,
2010; Chen and Yuan, 2004; Chen et al., 2010b, 2011; Fan et al., 2012; Haw et al., 2011; Haw et al., 2005; Kim
et al., 2011). China research has used the emerging auditing and public accounting setting to provide interest-
ing insights into the interactions between agency issues and audit quality/auditor independence (see for exam-
ple, Chen et al., 2010a, 2010c, 2000; DeFond et al., 2000; Wang et al., 2008; Fan and Wong, 2005; Gul et al.,
2009; Choi et al., 2010; Yang, forthcoming). Overall, China accounting research provides useful insights into
how agency issues are related to ﬁnancial reporting quality and audit quality.
Even though in the next section, I provide other possible avenues for China accounting research, the focus of
examining agency issues is still nascent andhas the potential to contributemanymore insights. In addition,China
provides a setting to examine the development of markets in fast-forward. Speciﬁcally, the development of the
private audit market where consolidation, scaling-up, and gaining expertise occurred in a relatively short span
of time provides an interesting avenue to gain insights into the evolution of the audit servicesmarket – speciﬁcally
the eﬀects of market concentration on audit quality and audit fees (for example, see Chan and Wu, 2011).5. Further opportunities for accounting research in China
This section outlines research questions that will help us enhance our understanding of the role of account-
ing in non-market-based settings. In our tradition of research silos, these questions likely belong to the genre
of managerial accounting. The questions may not have the same appeal as managerial opportunism, and how
better market-based institutions help “prevent” or “stop” such opportunism. The Chinese setting could help
us understand forces and empirically test insights from analytical studies. We have considerable insights from
game-theory based studies into the role of accounting in market-based versus implicit contract-based institu-
tional settings (see Glover, 2012; Baldenius, 2008; Ederhof et al., 2010; Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2011;
Kanodia, 2006; Arya and Mittendorf, 2010; Liang, 2010). Also, as Chen and Schipper (2008) posit, analytical
modeling of forces particularly relevant for the China setting could provide us with more insights.
These studies should utilize a combination of methods – archival empirical, ﬁeld-study empirical, analytical
and case study, and/or a combination of methods so as to provide us with insights as well as highlight new
areas of management accounting and institutional research.5.1. Commitment to enforcing contracts without laws1
China had no “eﬀective” commercial code for contracting up until the 1990s and no formal private prop-
erty protection laws up until 2004. Theoretically, during this period, ownership of shares in enterprises would
hold little water, and as such, the valuation and stock returns that are used in empirical tests were based on
belief that such private property protection laws would be enacted and enforced. Similarly, customers con-
tracted with suppliers without the framework of a uniform commercial code, under the belief that informal
institutions were eﬀective in implementing contracts. Did it imply that China had no institutions in the broad
sense? The answer is an unequivocal no. Xu (2011) states that RDAs exercised semiformal and informal1 These categories are not mutually exclusive. I provide the categories to bring to fore the multifaceted and rich context.
S. Radhakrishnan / China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 1–8 5protection of private property and contract enforcement mechanisms that were primarily based either on the
rich history of China or by social norms. These informal institutions are generally ignored by accounting
research.2 Examining the role of these institutions can help provide useful insights into commitment, rules,
and standards. Some broad research questions are as follows:
1. What were the informal institutions that acted as a commitment device for buyers contracting with suppli-
ers? Did sub-national governments enable such coordination?
2. How was reputation for such commitments formed? If these were eﬀective, what was the need for uniform
commercial codes?5.2. Deviant behavior and commitment issues
Becker (1974) brings economic analysis to crime and punishment and shows that the optimal enforcement
depends on cost of catching and convicting the oﬀenders, the punishment meted out and the response of
oﬀenders to the changes in enforcement and punishment. These form part of social capital. Putnam (1993,
p. 167) deﬁnes social capital as “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, which
can improve the eﬃciency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.” Putnam (1993, p. 173) argues, “The
denser such networks in a community, the more likely that its citizens will be able to cooperate for mutual
beneﬁt.” As a thought exercise, one should wonder why it is that we hear about accounting/audit failures only
after China has transitioned to using institutions to support the market-based system. Is it because the insti-
tutions that mete out punishment are not in sync? Is detecting more accounting failures a hallmark of good
institutions? Is detecting more accounting failures indicative of informal or traditional institutions in China
being adequate to mitigate agency problems? In Putnam’s framework, is it possible that arms-length contract-
ing makes these networks less dense and as such the social norms and cooperation for mutual beneﬁt does not
occur? Answers to these questions can provide some key insights into the role of accounting3.
Sunder (1997) points out that the ﬁrm is “an arena in which self-motivated economic agents play by mutu-
ally agreed upon or implied rules to achieve their respective objectives.” The comparative advantage of a ﬁrm
over formal institutional arrangements that we observe under arms-length contracting is in enforcing implicit
contracts. Considering China Inc. as one behemoth ﬁrm, the natural question that arises is that did the infor-
mal and implied rules enable enhanced coordination of activities? The existence of informal institutions and
the variation across RDAs could provide a rich context of examining the costs and beneﬁts of these setups.
For example, informal institutions by their very nature cannot be scaled-up. An interesting question to exam-
ine is the following: even though market-based institutions facilitate scaling-up operations and thus enhance
economic growth, what is the associated costs – is it the additional failures in market-based systems when
compared to informal settings?5.3. State Owned Enterprises and private small and medium enterprises
Xu and Zhuang (1998) point out that roughly 2000 counties in China had State Owned Enterprises (SOEs)
producing agricultural machinery, 300 counties had steel plants. Regional SOEs produced 69% of China’s
total fertilizer output and 59% of its total cement; and about 20 provinces had SOEs producing automobiles
or tractors in the early 1990s. This decentralized production structure and autonomy for decision-making2 This malaise is not typical to accounting research. Xu (2011) points out that cross-country studies that include China in the economics
literature and states, “according to some “standard” policy advice, these more informal institutions might be regarded as obstacles that
should be replaced by “standard” institutions as quickly as possible, even though setting up “standard” institutions may be very diﬃcult,
time- consuming, or even counter-productive under certain political conditions.” Basu (2012) emphasizes about how accounting research
has been inﬂuenced by the economics or ﬁnance literature. And as such it is not surprising that we are ardent followers of main-stream
cross-country economics research as well.
3 Firth et al., 2012 examine the changing legal liability of auditors and its eﬀect on the way auditors are organized and the accounting
quality.
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RDAs are allowed to experiment and be innovative with respect to the transition to the market-based econ-
omy. Studying the incentive schemes of promotions and transfers and their relationship to accounting and
other performance measures will provide interesting insights. Recent studies provide insights into some of
these aspects. For example, Du et al. (2012) examine the evaluations of SOEs and ﬁnd that the political con-
nections of SOE, CFOs, geography of the SOE, and the political rank of the SOE inﬂuence their evaluations.
In addition, studying the failed experiments as well as the successful ones could provide us with insights into
the institutions that are necessary or suﬃcient for markets and enterprises. Were CEOs of SOEs rewarded for
experimenting or were they rewarded for bottom-line performance?
Sub-national regions developed industry clusters. For example, private small and family enterprises in the
town of Datang focus on producing socks, in Shengzhou focus on buttons for clothes, in Songxia focus on
producing umbrellas. There are many such industry clusters. Liu (2008) shows how the small enterprises
are important for economic growth, and how the regional and national governments helped develop such
industry clusters. It will be interesting to examine whether the performance evaluation measures used for
regional SOEs are partly driven by their role in helping the infrastructure development and promotion of
industry clusters. In essence, are the SOEs a vehicle for supporting regional economic development? And if
this question is answered in the aﬃrmative, could this be the reason why their stock performance lags behind
the non-SOEs.
5.4. Accounting and control systems in conglomerates
As mentioned earlier, similar to a conglomerate, in China Inc., the personnel decisions for the RDAs were
made by the headquarters/central government. The headquarters could provide high-power incentives based
on promotions and transfers to other sub-national units so as to transfer knowledge or as a demotion.4 Given
the economic success of China Inc., many interesting questions related to management control systems and
incentives can be examined in the following broad categories.5
1. What measures of performance are used for performance evaluation and promotion?
a. Were they measures of infrastructure, i.e., institutions that are necessary for transitioning to market-
based economy or were they based on bottom-line measures of proﬁtability?
b. Were they output, intermediate or input measures?
c. Given that most of the institution building exercise would have relied heavily on intangibles and
human capital, what measures were used for such intangibles?
d. Were there diﬀerent measures at diﬀerent stages or was there an all-encompassing measure such as
GDP or bottom-line for SOEs?
e. For SOEs in particular what type of measures were used? Were they based on the concept of proﬁts
for the owners?
f. Were performance measures more precise at lower levels than at higher levels of the hierarchy?
g. Were the measures subjective or objective?
h. Were the measures aggregated or granular?
2. Were disclosures of these performance measures voluntary or mandatory? Were performance measures
changed and modiﬁed based on the nature of experiments?
3. What commitment mechanism was in place to provide credibility to the relationship between incentives and
measures? Was it implicit or explicit?4 Of course, given the extent of corruption it will be diﬃcult to disentangle whether the motivating force is monetary or non-monetary.
Hung et al. (2012) examine why SOEs with strong political connections are more likely to list overseas than non-politically connected
SOEs and ﬁnd that overseas listing itself appears to be a goal; as such, the bottom-line performance metrics are more poor for politically
connected than non-politically connected SOEs.
5 Recent studies provide insights into these aspects. For example, Du et al. (2012) examine the evaluations of SOEs and ﬁnd that the
political connections of SOE, CFOs, geography of the SOE and the political rank of the SOE inﬂuence their evaluations.
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5. Were principles of transfer pricing and cost allocation used? If yes, how and why?
6. Were performance measures uniform or were they changed to suit local conditions?
7. How were performance targets set? Were they participative, i.e., bottom-up or top-down? How are
variances of the actuals from the targets dealt with for incentives?
The premise underlying the questions outlined above may look as if China Inc.’s management control
systems were designed so well such that the costs of conglomerates were “fully” overcome; however, this is
not likely to be the case. For example, it is well known that conglomerates are more likely to overinvest
(Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002); similar to this, casual empiricism suggests that there are considerable
overinvestments – for example, there are ghost cities such as Zhengzhou. Studying these costs of conglomer-
ates, i.e., overinvestments, would provide interesting insights for accounting and management control systems.
6. Conclusion
China provides an excellent setting to examine questions on coordination and control mechanisms for con-
glomerates and provide insights for management accounting. Furthermore, gaining insights into the costs and
beneﬁts of informal and formal institutional setup would be important to draw distinctions between aggrega-
tion and disaggregation of information for planning and control purposes. While this will be challenging,
editors of journals should be proactive in encouraging such inquiry.
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